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This Introduction to Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law (Gregory Klass,
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming) describes
the field of contract theory and locates the essays in the volume within that field.
The volume includes chapters from Aditi Bagchi, Randy Barnett, Lisa Bernstein,
Mindy Chen-Wishart, Charles Fried, Avery Katz, Dori Kimel, Gregory Klass, George
Letsas and Prince Saprai, Daniel Markovits, Liam Murphy, David Owens, J.E.
Penner, Margaret Jane Radin, Joseph Raz, Stephen Smith, and Charlie Webb.

Contract theory is not one thing, but a collection of related inquiries. There
is variety both in the questions theorists ask and in the methods they use to answer
them. Among the questions are: What is distinctive about contract law? What are
its core concepts? For what purpose do we enforce contracts? What justifies their
enforcement? Given one or another function or justification, what should the rules
of contract law be? What moral or political principles are relevant to the
enforcement of contracts? There is also variety in method. Principled arguments of
contract start from above. They ask first what justifies having a law of contract, and
from that derive what the rules of contract law should be. Interpretive arguments
begin from below. They examine the contract law we have, then ask what
functions and justifications provide the best account of the practice. Critical
analyses look for hidden purposes or unintended consequences, such as contract
law’s role in legitimizing or reproducing power relationships. Theorists also use a
variety of analytic tools. These include moral and political theory, conceptual
analysis, sociological theory, interpretation, neoclassical economic analysis and
empirical psychology.
This introduction sketches the field and locates in it the chapters that
follow. We have organized those chapters into two large groups: essays that focus
on general theoretical questions and essays that focus on more specific doctrinal
questions. But this is a rough cut at best, and only one way to divide things up.
Because they vary along multiple dimensions, contract theories cannot be ordered
around or along any single line. So this Introduction will zigzag a bit.
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It will help to define a few technical terms. Laws and collections of laws are
instruments that society can employ to achieve one or more purposes. The purpose
or purposes a law serves constitute its function. Because laws involve the
deployment of collective resources and are ultimately backed by state coercion,
they also require justification. That justification, if it exists, can be found in the
moral, political or other principles that render the use of collective resources and
state coercion permissible.1 Finally, it is sometimes argued that distinct areas of
law, such as the law of contract, have an internal logic or core set of commitments.
Just as a language has a grammar, contract law might have basic rules or
commitments that structure the practice as a whole. This immanent logic, if it
exists, is contract law’s conceptual structure. Noncritical general theories of
contract typically focus on one or more of contract law’s function, its justification
and its conceptual structure.
Much contract theory occupies itself one way or another with the
relationship between contracts, which create legal obligations, and promises,
which create moral ones. Contract law itself uses the language of promising. Courts
and commentators regularly refer to the parties as “promisor” and “promisee,” and
the Restatement (Second) of Contract opens by saying that a contract is “a promise
or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”2 And no matter
what words the law uses, there are obvious similarities between contracts and
promises. Both are largely content independent, voluntarily acquired obligations
owed to a particular person or persons.
Saying all that does not yet say what the relation between the legal
obligation and the moral one is. One answer is that contract law functions to
enforce certain promises. In contemporary Anglo-American scholarship, the thesis
is most closely associated with Charles Fried’s 1981 book, Contract as Promise.
Fried’s chapter in this volume updates that theory in light of subsequent work in the
field. As Fried points out, dominant trends in contract theory have changed
considerably in the past thirty years. The reliance-based and critical approaches
that ruled when he wrote the book have been supplanted by economic analysis,
corrective justice, and new autonomy theories. Fried’s chapter discusses the
relationship between his approach in Contract as Promise and subsequent work in
the field. And he uses his chapter to provide new thoughts on topics such as the
common law’s preference for expectation damages, the consideration doctrine,

1

As Charlie Webb puts the point in this volume, ”even where the law’s technical
rules are determinate and neither require nor invite [appeal to value judgments],
these source-based norms earn a place in our reasoning and decision-making only
on the back of norms which get there on the merits.” Charlie Webb, Contract as
Fact and as Reason, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at
1] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1983).
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unconscionability, the mitigation rule, contract interpretation, and the objective
theory.
The claim that contracts just are legally enforceable promises has led many
contract theorists back to moral theory and the analysis of promissory obligations.
Fried, for example, argues that the institution of promising, and by extension
contract, is built “on the deeper morality of trust and respect for persons.”3 Three
chapters in this book focus on the morality of promising. Although they make
different claims, each recommends paying attention not only to the new obligations
a promisor acquires through her promise, but also to the normative interests or
obligations of the promisee.
David Owens asks whether promises are properly characterized as
transferring something from the promisor to the promisee. He argues against the
common claim that a promise transfers the right to performance—that “[b]y
promising, I transfer my . . . entitlement to act within a certain range of options,
thereby giving that power to others.”4 Appealing to Hume’s point that the mere fact
of having a right does not entail the power to alienate or transfer it, Owens argues
that right-transfer theories cannot explain why promises bind. In Owens's view, the
effect of a promise is rather to give the promisee the power to determine the
promisor’s moral obligations by deciding whether to insist on performance or to
release the promisor from her obligation. Promises thereby serve what Owens calls
the promisee’s “Authority Interest.” “By postulating an interest in the normative
item that the promisee acquires we can identify the source of a promise’s binding
force.”5
Joseph Raz’s chapter explores several aspects of the reasons promises
generate. Promises are generally content independent: the reason they bind does
not depend on the act promised. Some acts, however, cannot be promised, such as
selling oneself into slavery. Raz explains this fact by arguing that the power to
promise exists only because, and to the extent that, it enhances our moral lives.
There is no value to giving people the power to enslave themselves. Working from
the same premise, Raz argues that promisors need not have the power to determine
the strength of the reasons for performance that their promises create—to determine
the strength of their promises. The fact that having the power to promise is valuable
“does not mean that there is value in people being able to determine the strength of

3

Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 8] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
4
Gary Watson, Promises, Reasons and Normative Powers, in REASONS FOR ACTION
155, 170 (D. Sabel & S. Wall eds., 2009), quoted in Owens MS at 17.
5
David Owens, Does a Promise Transfer a Right?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 18] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai
eds., 2014). For a more thorough discussion of this claim, see DAVID J. OWENS,
SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (2012).
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the reasons that promises generate.”6 Raz then asks how it is that the mere act of
promising can create a new reason to act. He argues contra Owens that the reason
to act is not a “bare reason” generated by the mere fact of the promise. Rather a
promise gives the promisor a reason to perform because of the “normative
assurance” that a promise provides the promisee, which is the promisee’s
opportunity to receive performance.
Dori Kimel also considers the normative position of the promisee. But
where Raz and Owens emphasize the normative powers that a promise confers on
the promisee, Kimel is interested in the promisee’s moral duties in exercising those
powers. Drawing from contract law, Kimel argues that promissory obligations are
strict. Unless the promisor builds an excuse into the content of her promise,
nonperformance is a breach of the promise, no matter what its reason or cause.
This makes promising an especially risky business, in that a promisor might
undertake obligations she later has reason to regret. If this is right, then “the
capacity to self-create obligations owed to others may be thought of not only as a
manifestation or an extension of personal autonomy, but also as something that can
pose a particularly potent threat to it.”7 In fact, we might do better without the
power to promise. The threat is reduced, however, by moral obligations of the
promisee to sometimes exercise the power to release the promisor from her
promise. Kimel argues that “promises are typically made or exchanged in . . . the
sort of relationships that tend to generate a wealth of relationship-specific norms
capable of supplementing, competing with, altering or altogether defeating
promissory norms.”8 The promisee’s nonpromissory obligations of friendship, for
example, can require her to excuse nonperformance when the promisor is not at
fault, thereby reducing the risk attached to the unwise promise.
For those who believe that contract law functions to enforce promissory
obligations, such arguments about the structure and scope of the moral obligation
are highly relevant to understanding the structure and scope of the corresponding
legal obligation. (I argue below that they might be relevant to other contract
theorists as well, for other reasons.) If promissory obligations are the reason for
enforcing contracts, we need to know what promissory obligations are and what
they entail.
But promissory theories of contract are not without their critics. The critics
can be divided into two broad camps: those who agree with Fried that contract
serves moral ends, but reject his account of those ends, and those who reject moral
accounts of contract law altogether.
6

Joseph Raz, Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 1o] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
7
Dori Kimel, Promise, Contract, Personal Autonomy, and the Freedom to Change
One’s Mind, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 3]
(Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
8
Id. at [MS at 14].
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Many who agree with Fried that contract serves moral ends do not agree
with his claim that it serves to enforce promises. These theorists depart from Fried
in two distinct ways.9 First, some hold that the legally relevant moral obligations
are not, or not only, promissory obligations. In his contribution to this volume,
James Penner argues that contracts are best understood as involving agreements
rather than promises.10 Penner suggests several differences. First and foremost,
whereas promises are unilateral acts, agreements are bilateral, involving active
participation and commitment by all sides. In addition, agreements often arise in
conditions where there is a preexisting obligation to coordinate behavior or a
shared interest in accomplishing some project. And agreements are typically built
on a shared foundation of mutual trust and an appreciation of one another’s
interests, whereas promises are often prompted by the promisee’s mistrust of the
promisor. On Penner’s account, “promises are typically parasitic on prior
agreements and are ‘pathological’ in the sense that they are typically only sought or
given when a person already obliged is, for one reason or another, less than
optimally likely to fulfill their obligation.”11 If Penner is correct, we should look for
a moral basis for the law of contract not in the morality of promises, but in the
morality of agreements more generally. Such a shift could shed new light on
doctrines such as the requirement of good faith, the frustration and impracticability
defenses, and the mitigation rule.
Other theorists question whether contract law’s function with respect to the
parties’ moral obligations is one of simple enforcement. Liam Murphy’s chapter
distinguishes three functions contract law might play with respect to the moral
sphere. First, contract law might enforce the first-order moral obligation to perform,
as Fried suggests. Second, contract law might enforce second-order obligations that
come into being only after the wrong of breach, as corrective justice theories claim.
Third, contract law might be deployed instrumentally to increase social welfare,
attending to the parties’ particular obligations to one another only as a means to
that broader end. Murphy discusses examples of the first two approaches, which he
argues do not succeed. Enforcement theories are difficult to square with the law’s
preference for expectation damages over specific performance, and they run
contrary to a liberal suspicion of using state coercion “merely for the sake of
improving a person’s own welfare, or enforcing their obligations, or making them

9

Both are discussed in Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 695
(2012).
10
Penner’s chapter updates and extends his earlier work on the subject in J.E.
Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of Contract, 2 LEGAL
THEORY 325 (1996).
11
J.E. Penner, Promises, Agreements, and Contracts, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 18] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
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more virtuous.”12 Expectation-based corrective justice theories “offer[] no argument
at all for the idea that all promisees have moral rights that it is the business of the
law to protect.”13 Reliance-based corrective justice theories can explain neither
why the law provides recovery for reliance on promises but not other sorts of
reliance, nor the law’s preference for the expectation measure. This leaves
instrumentalist approaches, which “will not try to track the moral duties and
interests of parties to particular agreements but will rather take a broader view,
finding the point of the institution in the overall social good it produces.”14
Murphy’s preferred instrumentalist approach is like economic analysis in that it
identifies contract law’s function as the promotion of social welfare. But Murphy
takes a broader view of what constitutes social welfare. Whereas traditional
economic analyses ask what remedies are likely to maximize the parties’ joint
profits, Murphy would ask what remedy is better for society as a whole, with a
focus on contract law’s role in supporting the social practice of making and
keeping agreements.
Charlie Webb argues in his chapter that contracts necessarily give rise to
promissory obligations, but that those obligations are not the reason for their legal
enforcement. Contracts entail promises, according to Webb, because legal
obligations claim to be moral obligations and so to voluntarily undertake a legal
duty to perform a contract is also to voluntarily undertake a moral obligation to do
so. “[I]f and in so far as contracts do involve the voluntary assumption of
obligations—whatever their content—then these obligations are moral
obligations.”15 It does not follow, however, that the promise is the reason for legal
enforcement. “Whatever reasons we may identify for regarding promises as
obligation-creating may not be reasons to take them as creating legal rights and
duties such as support state policing and intervention in the event of breach.”16
Webb does not fully articulate a theory of legal enforcement, but suggests that the
relationship to the theory of promises is complex. On the one hand, the conditions
of contractual validity clearly do not track the conditions of promissory obligations.
On the other, the law can help to inform promisors as to the scope of their
obligations. The morality of promising, in Webb’s account, is relevant to the theory
of contract, but the latter “need neither begin nor end with an account of
promissory obligation.”17
Penner, Murphy and Webb do not deny that contract law might serve a
moral function. They depart from Fried only in what each considers that function to
12

Liam Murphy, The Practice of Promise and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 12] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
13
Id. at [MS at 20].
14
Id. [MS at at 22].
15
Webb, supra note 1, at [MS at 14].
16
Id. at [MS at 17].
17
Id. at [MS at 19].
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be. Other theorists maintain that the function of contract law is not to be found in
the parties’ moral obligations at all. Like Fried, Randy Barnett is an autonomy
theorist. But Barnett rejects promissory or other moral theories of contract. In this
volume, he argues that Fried’s promise theory can neither explain the objective
approach to contract interpretation nor guide lawmakers as to the appropriate
default rules. More fundamentally, Barnett, like Murphy, argues that the law has no
business enforcing the private morality of promising. Barnett would not agree with
Murphy, however, that the function of contract law is therefore to support the
moral practice more broadly. Rather than focusing on parties’ moral relationships,
contract law should ask only whether the parties to a transaction have consented to
legal enforcement—whether at the time of formation they intended to be legally
bound. Both Fried and Barnett are autonomy theorists. But where Fried’s promise
theory views contract law as imposing duties based on the parties’ autonomous
moral act of promising, Barnett characterizes it as conferring on them the legal
power to autonomously undertake legal obligations to one another, no matter what
their moral relationship.18 For Barnett, “the private morality of promise resides in
the realm of ethics,” whereas “the morality of contract resides in the realm of
justice.”19
Barnett’s consent theory of contract reflects his principled commitment to a
libertarian theory of legal entitlements.20 Other theorists provide other arguments
for depicting contract as a sort of private legislative power that is independent of
the parties’ promise-based obligations. Dori Kimel has argued that contracts are not
promises, but substitute for promises in situations where thicker forms of trust are
not available.21 Michael Pratt has constructed a thought experiment to demonstrate
how one might undertake contractual obligations while at the same time effectively
abjuring promissory ones.22
Another largely amoral account of contractual obligations can be found in
economic analyses of contract law. The application of economic tools to legal
questions is more common in the United States than elsewhere in the Englishspeaking world. Two chapters in this book provide windows into the approach.
Avery Katz’s chapter describes the basic concepts of economic legal analysis, such
as the distinction between positive and normative economic analysis, how
18

For more thoughts on theories of contract law as duty-imposing and as powerconferring, see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and
Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008).
19
Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 16] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
20
See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2000).
21
DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF
CONTRACT (2002).
22
Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008).
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economists model decision making, and efficiency. Katz suggests several reasons to
think that the normative economic analysis of contract law makes special sense,
especially when it comes to contracts between sophisticated parties.
In commerce, it is easier to value things in monetary terms and to
calculate costs and benefits; and economic gain is usually the
motivation for the transaction. In addition, contractual obligations
are typically undertaken deliberately, at arms’ length, and with
managerial oversight if not professional legal assistance. The
economic model of rational choice provides a more plausible
account in such settings than it does when applied to less
calculating actors such as negligent tortfeasors, divorcing spouses,
criminals, or residential tenants.23
Moreover, because such contracts involve exchanges understood by sophisticated
parties and to which they must consent, gains in overall efficiency are likely to be
shared among them to make everyone better off. After mapping out three distinct
approaches to economic analysis of the law, Katz provides the reader with
examples of economic analyses of formation rules, the choice between private
enforcement and state enforcement, contract interpretation, and the measure of
damages for breach. Katz concludes with a discussion of where economic analysis
stands with respect to other jurisprudential approaches to contract law. And he
suggests that whether or not lawyers, judges or legislators accept the prescriptive
claims of normative economic analysis, they can and should employ the tools of
economic analysis when performing their various roles.
My own chapter focuses on the best-known and most controversial
example of the economic analysis of contract: the theory of efficient breach, which
first appeared in the literature more than forty years ago. After recounting a simple
version of the theory and some common noneconomic criticisms of it, I describe
four ways in which subsequent economic accounts have rejected and moved
beyond the simple theory. Many non-economist critics of efficient breach, it turns
out, are criticizing a theory that no serious economist would defend. But contract
theorists should still pay attention to efficient breach theory. A more sophisticated
version of the theory reveals three distinctive features of contract law that
noneconomic theories often overlook: “remedies often affect prices; parties often
prefer efficient remedies; and lawmakers must decide whether, when or how
parties might choose the remedy.”24 This claim is consistent with Murphy’s
suggestion that any instrumentalist theory should take economic analysis into
23

Avery W. Katz, Economic Foundations of Contract Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 8] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
24
Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT
LAW ___, [MS at 2] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
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account because economic analysis of the law offers “the only sustained attempt at
explaining how legal rules affect behavior.”25
Like consent theories, economic accounts view contract law as functioning
primarily to confer on parties a private legislative power, rather than as taking
account of independently acquired moral obligations. On these theories, contract
law does not serve to enforce, support, or otherwise respond to the parties’ moral
obligations. These theories do, however, treat contract as a legal analog to the
moral power of promising. Both contract and promise give persons the ability to
voluntarily undertake new obligations—one legal, the other moral. This similarity
provides an independent reason for contract theorists to pay attention to promise
theory, whether or not they think that the point of contract is to enforce promisebased obligations. Thus Kimel, who believes that contracts are not promises but
substitute for them, draws at the end of his chapter an analogy between contract
and promise. Like promises, contracts can both expand autonomy and, when done
wrongly, endanger it. Kimel suggests that this helps explain doctrines like the
consideration requirement and the common use of money damages rather than
specific performance. And Kimel’s thoughts about a promisee’s moral obligation to
sometimes release a promisor find their counterpart in George Letsas and Prince
Saprai’s observations, discussed below, about a nonbreaching party’s obligation to
mitigate damages. Similarly, Owens’s analysis in this volume of transfer theories of
promise has implications for transfer theories of contract. Raz’s observations about
the limits on a promisor’s power to decide the strength of her promise suggest ways
of thinking about whether parties should have the power to specify the remedy for
breach. And the Owens and Raz chapters both suggest that contract theorists might
pay more attention to the legal powers of the promisee, such as waiver, demanding
adequate assurance, affirmation, cancellation, and a suit for breach. In short, one
need not be a promise theorist to think that a clear understanding of the morality of
promising is likely to cast new light on the law of contract.
The moral theories discussed above largely assume a sphere of moral
obligations that exists and can be specified independently of the law of contracts.
Other theorists argue instead for an intrinsic and distinctive morality of contract—
one that might well be compatible with both consent and efficiency theories.
Daniel Markovits has argued that contracts generate not promises but a distinctive
form of moral relationship all their own.26 In his chapter in this volume, Markovits
argues that, properly understood, the obligation of good faith that attaches to every
contract exemplifies a more general moral relationship of solidarity that contracts
produce. The case begins with an analysis of the outer bounds of the duty. The
duty of good faith is, Markovits argues, both “thin (being limited to respect for an
antecedently and independently agreed surplus allocation) and flexible (being open

25
26

Murphy, supra note 12 [MS at 23].
See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).
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to any surplus allocation on which the parties have so agreed).”27 On this
interpretation, the duty is neither a separate obligation nor a gap-filling rule, but
simply the obligation to abide by the parties’ shared intentions with respect to their
agreement. A party’s duty of good faith is her obligation not to “abandon her
contractual intentions, including the intention to adjust to unanticipated
contingencies in a fashion that secures the success of the contractual
collaboration’s shared plan.”28 This attitude and the distinctive form of solidarity it
generates together define a moral perspective that underlies not only the
marketplace, but liberal democratic societies more generally.
Markovits’s project is to describe a moral relation distinctive of contractual
relationships. That project involves abstracting from the various other moral
relations in which contracting parties might find themselves. Thus Markovits goes
so far as to suggest that “contract possesses the power to launder injustice, creating
legitimate entitlements between parties where previous there were none.”29 Several
other contributors emphasize instead ways in which nonvoluntary moral
obligations apply to contracting parties in their relations with one another. Without
denying that contracts are distinguished by voluntary obligations—moral, legal or
both—these authors argue that contracts also implicate other values or moral
principles, and that a complete account of contract law must attend to those values
or principles as well.
Aditi Bagchi argues that as a result of the exclusive focus on promise,
“contract is not regarded as an elaboration of the standards of fairness in private
exchange, which might plausibly involve a range of moral principles, but only a
deconstruction of the morality of promising.”30 Bagchi, however, is interested in
distributive justice, and especially the fact that the background conditions of many
contracts involve unjust distribution. She allows that contract law is in several
respects a poor tool for doing distributive justice. Contracts enforce particular
agreements, whereas distributive injustice is systematic; the consent of the
disadvantaged party might seem to vitiate broader claims of distributive justice; and
there is a real worry that the attempts to regulate inequality in exchange will
backfire and impose greater harms on disadvantaged parties, whether by producing
iniquitous terms elsewhere in the transaction or by excluding disadvantaged parties
from the market. But even granting these worries, Bagchi argues that distributive
injustices should sometimes inform when society chooses to provide a party with
the benefit of legal enforcement. And, she argues, a complete account of contract
27

Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contract’s Core Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 14] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas &
Prince Saprai eds., 2014). MS at 14.
28
Id. at [MS at 25].
29
Id. at [MS at 24].
30
Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 1] (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai
eds., 2014).
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law must attend to distributive justice, since “some of the background duties that
infuse contract are derivative from principles of distributive justice.”31
As already mentioned, George Letsas and Prince Saprai argue in their
chapter that the mitigation rule is best explained by obligations that are neither
promissory nor specific to contracts. They maintain that the rule is not, as Charles
Fried has argued, grounded in a duty of altruism generated by the parties’
relationship, but that it is a special application of a general principle of fairness.
Although the nonbreaching party has no altruistic duty to avoid losses, it would be
unfair for her to claim compensation for losses that she could have avoided without
undue burden. Letsas and Saprai argue that the doctrinal elaborations of the
mitigation rule found in English law largely conform to the requirements of the
fairness principle. And, they argue, the appeal to fairness provides answers to
Seana Shiffrin’s claim that the mitigation rule is inconsistent with promissory
morality and to Dori Kimel’s argument that the mitigation rule is grounded in the
harm principle. “[S]eemingly divergent doctrines of contract law can be justified if
one considers the interaction between the promise principle and other moral
principles.”32
Mindy Chen-Wishart’s chapter also describes a “conceptual space for the
operation of principles beyond consent” in contract law.33 Chen-Wishart’s analysis
focuses on vitiating factors such as incapacity, unconscionability, mistake,
misrepresentation and duress, or what in the United States are commonly termed
“formation defenses.” She argues that these doctrines are structured to impose
responsibility for reasonable expectations and reliance, to ensure fair dealing and
withhold state support for exploitation, to advance both corrective and distributive
justice, to advance community values, and to ensure administrability. After
considering and rejecting consent-based accounts of these rules, Chen-Wishart
argues that autonomy is a defeasible principle—one that can be overridden by
other principles, policies and values. Against the charge that such pluralism
provides no guidance for courts when principles recommend different outcomes or
rules, Chen-Wishart argues that the several values she identifies are
complementary. More specifically, because “[t]he value of personal autonomy
depends on the worthiness of its exercise,” respect for autonomy requires also
attending to the values that establish that worthiness.34
Letsas and Saprai’s and Chen-Wishart’s chapters each argues that consentor promise-based principles fail to fully explain or justify the rules of contract law
31

Id. at 8.
George Letsas & Prince Saprai, Mitigation, Fairness and Contract Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 20] (Gregory Klass,
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
33
Mindy Chen-Wishart, The Nature of Vitiating Factors in Contract Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW ___, [MS at 1] (Gregory Klass,
George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014).
34
Id. at [MS at 23].
32
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we find in the world around us. To the extent that their arguments start from the
contract law we have, they can be classified as broadly interpretive. Stephen
Smith’s chapter on remedies also adopts an interpretive approach, though here
Smith is interested less in the moral basis of contract law than in its function.35
Smith poses a basic question about contract remedies: Is the reason for granting the
remedy the parties’ first-order duty to perform, as suggested by many corrective
justice theories, or is it the fact that a wrong has been committed by that duty’s
breach? Smith argues for the latter interpretation, based on the structure and
framing of common law damage awards, as well as more particular remedial rules
such as the privity requirement and the ready availability of consequential
damages. More broadly, the law does not impose a duty to pay damage upon
breach, but does so only after a court ruling that identifies the appropriate remedy
for the wrong. Together with additional theoretical considerations, these facts
suggest that “the aim of damages, in broad outline, is to provide redress for
wrongs,”36 and “damages orders create rather than confirm duties.”37 Like a fine or
punitive damages, compensatory damages for breach mark that a wrong has been
committed and shift responsibility for the consequences of that wrong to the
wrongdoer. “[D]amages are the private law equivalent of punishment.”38
Smith’s analysis exemplifies a tradition of interpretive and conceptual legal
analysis that is stronger in Commonwealth countries than in the United States. Such
scholarship aims to uncover the law’s immanent logic and the legal principles that
a common law judge might rely on to extend an existing rule to a novel case or to
resolve inconsistencies within the doctrine. To US theorists and jurists steeped in
the Legal Realist tradition, such arguments might appear formalist. But they can
also figure into theories of the function or justification of contract law by suggesting
alternative purposes the law might serve, and providing a better understanding of
which theories fit with existing practice and which recommend revising it.
Much in contract theory depends on the choice of examples or paradigm
cases. Those who find the function of contract in the parties’ moral obligations
often focus on relatively low-stakes agreements between natural persons. Those
who think of contract primarily as a private legislative power are more likely to
emphasize high-stakes transactions between sophisticated parties, especially firms.
(Barnett, whose consent theory is grounded in libertarian considerations, is an
exception to the latter generalization.) The importance of examples can also be
seen in the differences between the contributions of Lisa Bernstein and Margaret
Jane Radin.
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Working within a broadly instrumentalist framework, Lisa Bernstein
explores the interaction between legal obligations and extralegal forms of
assurance such as repeat-play, reputation, and nonlegal norms. Her thesis is
twofold. First, she argues against attempts to give legal effect to customary business
norms, commonly referred to as “trade usage.” Using a mix of empirical and
informal economic analysis, Bernstein argues that in many economic spheres there
is no widespread agreement on trade usage, that where trade usage does exist it is
often difficult to verify in court, and that most sophisticated parties do not want
courts to use trade usage to interpret their agreements. Second, Bernstein criticizes
courts’ use of two other types of context evidence: course of dealings—the parties’
actions in earlier similar transactions—and course of performance—how the parties
performed under the contract at issue. One problem with using such evidence is
that every deviation from contractual requirements then has the potential to change
the parties’ legal obligations. That result is likely to deter the flexibility in
performance that many contemporary transactions require, which in turn can
prevent the parties from utilizing “extralegal commitments backed only by
reputation bonds and other types of nonlegal sanctions.”39 Another problem is that
the use of such evidence increases a large organization’s costs of doing business, as
it must constantly monitor employees’ actions to guard against unwanted changes
to the organization’s legal obligations. Again, Bernstein collects a range of
empirical evidence that, for these and other reasons, sophisticated parties
commonly craft their contracts to exclude such evidence from the interpretation of
their contracts. If Bernstein is correct, no matter what the social interest in
enforcing the obligations generated by parties’ actual expectations and agreements,
sophisticated parties do not want such enforcement. And if given the opportunity,
they will contract out of it.
Bernstein’s arguments are an example of the new formalism in contract
theory. “New” here refers not to the theory’s vintage. The arguments have now
been around for over twenty years.40 It is used, rather, to distinguish the theory from
an older formalism often associated with Christopher Columbus Langdell and
Samuel Williston and sharply criticized by the first generation of Legal Realists. In
contrast to the old formalism, the new formalism employs instrumentalist,
economic and empirical arguments, putting it squarely in the Realist camp.
Margaret Jane Radin’s chapter also adopts a broadly empirical and Realist
approach, but emphasizes the costs of formalism in other contracting contexts.
39
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Where Bernstein is interested in the rules for interpreting valid contracts, Radin
focuses on the rules that determine whether a contract is valid. And where
Bernstein limits her analysis to contracts between sophisticated parties, Radin
considers transactions with nonsophisticates. Radin’s topic is transactions in which
an unsophisticated party agrees to a form contract provided on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis by a sophisticated party that engages in many similar transactions. Common
examples of such “boilerplate” contracts include employment contracts, consumer
contracts, and the licensing agreements to which users “agree” every time they
choose to install or update a piece of software. The enforcement of these
agreements in the United States turns almost entirely on the nonsophisticated
party’s formal act of agreement, without a significant inquiry into the quality of her
consent or the fairness of the terms. The reason, Radin argues, is that in the United
States the only mechanism for policing these agreements is the judicially developed
unconscionability doctrine. After identifying several problems with that approach,
Radin suggests a nonformalist framework for determining when to enforce
boilerplate terms. Here Radin emphasizes not only the potential costs to the
individual who agrees to unfavorable terms, but also the costs of the “large-scale
remedy-deletion”41 as terms proliferate, especially with respect to entitlements that
are “components of public regimes underwritten by the polity for the sake of the
structure of the polity itself.”42 Radin argues that we should not think of such
entitlements as either alienable or inalienable. Rather, we should consider making
some entitlements more difficult to sell than others. And if a contract purports to
transfer such an entitlement, the legal rule should examine not only the quality of
consent and the effects for the parties, but also the social and political effects of
widespread use of the term at issue. Public structures such as tort, contract and
antidiscrimination law “should not be undermined by individual contracts,
especially not when the contracts themselves may in fact be non-contracts.”43
Several chapters in this book address metatheoretical issues, such as what is
the question contract theorists should be asking and what sorts of arguments,
analyses or data can succeed in answering it. Charlie Webb spends a number of
pages arguing for the possibility of nonevaluative accounts of legal practices
generally.
Legal practice . . . provides us with two distinct objects of inquiry: (1) we
can inquire into how, as a matter of fact, decisions are and have been made
within a particular community or across a set of communities; and (2) we
can adopt the perspective of those acting within such a community, setting
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out to answer the same practical questions they face, identifying how they
really ought act.44
Webb deploys the possibility of nonevaluative legal theory to argue against the
relevance of interpretive theory along the lines Dworkin describes and Smith and
others practice.45
[W]hile we shouldn’t deny that an inquiry into reasons which might be said
to support these practices has the option not to consider those reasons on
their merits, once we abandon the search for the reasons which have in fact
guided these practices, it’s not clear why this is an option anyone would
want to take.46
Other chapters also address what makes for good contract theory. Murphy argues
that contract theorists should attend to the normative structure of existing contract
laws, but should not treat that structure as a limit on the contract law we might
want. Katz’s chapter on economic analysis is as much about the method of doing
contract theory as it is about the purpose or design contract law. Bernstein’s
chapter illustrates ways contract theorists might engage more with empirical work.
And Murphy and I both argue that they should engage more with economic
analyses of contract.
In our attempt to capture both the substantive and methodological variety
of contract theory within the space of a single volume we have had to omit
examples of each. If Oxford University Press had given us two volumes for this
project, we would also have included examples of reliance theories,47 of corrective
justice theories,48 of civil recourse theories,49 and of transfer theories.50 We would
44
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also have sought out examples of critical theories of contract,51 recent attempts to
apply behavioral economics and the methods of empirical psychology to contract
law,52 and theories that draw from major philosophical frameworks such as those of
Hegel or Aristotle.53 We believe, however, that the selection presented here will
provide the reader with a general introduction to the field. And we are enormously
grateful to the contributors to this volume, whose novel works are significantly
advancing our understanding of contract.
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